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The September 11 counter attacks an America have created something of a crisis 
for Islamic finance. The Bush administration had expressed misgivings about the 
involvement of Islamic banks in financing resistance operations in America and several 
unsuccessful lawsuits have been brought against leading Islamic financiers. Islamic banks 
have been insisting that they have played no part in financing the Islamic resistance to 
American dominance of the Muslim world. Islamic banks seek to present themselves as 
institutions, which can facilitate the subordinate integration of Muslim economies to 
American capitalism. 
 
The principle aim of Henry and Wilson’s book is to justify this claim of the 
Islamic banks. It seeks to show that the growth of “a new type of Islamic capitalism” has 
largely been a response to liberalization by governments in Muslim majority countries. 
These initiatives were usually articulated --through the Structural Adjustment Programs 
(redesigned as Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Programs) of the IMF and the 
Sectoral Programs of the World Bank. The growth of the Islamic banks  
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can legitimately be seen as a (perhaps unintentional) consequence of these programs. It is 
therefore not surprising that leading IMF and World Bank officials Sami’al Darvsih, 
Abbas Mirakhor and Mohsin Khan have played pioneering roles in the Islamic finance 
movement.  
 
The book under review recognizes the superficial nature of the Islamic banks 
rejection of interest “they appear to share a financial world view in which riba is 
abolished while the time value of money as understood in contemporary financial theory 
is respected” (P 2). Rodinson made much the same point about the legitimating of interest 
by the client Ulema of the Abbasi and Saljuk courts in medevial Iraq (Rodinson 1969 
Chap 7) 
  
Islamic banks exist in Muslim countries whose governments support them as “a 
part of a strategy to legitimate themselves” (P 2). At the beginning of 2002 Islamic banks 
esisted in 18 Muslim and six non Muslim countries (Switzerland, France, Netherlands, 
India, UK and the USA). Their share of commercial banks deposits in the Muslim 
countries averaged about 5 percent ranging from over 10 percent in the UAE to less than 
0.1 percent in Tunisia. These figures exclude Iran where unislamic financial practices are 
forbidden. These figures also do not include deposits in the Islamic branches of non-
Islamic banks. These are quite substantial in Egypt, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. The 
share of Islamic financial institutions in bank deposits in non-Muslim countries was 
usually less than 0.001 percent in 2002. 
 
On average about 60 percent of Islamic bank financing is on mark up basis 
Islamic banks have rechristianed markup as “ murabaha”. Above 90 percent of credit 
extended by Islamic banks requires borrowers to pay fixed periodic charges. This is 
implied interest by whatever Arabic, Turkish, Swaheli or Urdu name you call it (Warde 
2000 P 6) But apparently changing names is sufficient for satisfying members of the 
Religious Advisory Boards who guarantee the Islamicity of the products of Citibank, Abn 
Amro, HBSC and the 200 odd other members of the Geneva based International 
Association of Islamic Banks. Henry and Wilson are confident that “the (Islamic) 
financeries and their religious boards will (continue) to make compromises with the 
financial markets” (P 5) and the range of interest duplicate financial contracts offered by 
Islamic banks had been increasing rapidly over the last decade. Moreover “the most 
significant guarantee of Islamic banks’ future (is) the large Western multinational 
(banking sector which) has opened Islamic windows” (P5) 
 
Henry and Wilson describe in detail the patronage networks sustaining the Islamic 
bank. Monzer Kahf a senior executive of the Jeddah based Islamic Development Bank 
attributes the rise of the Islamic banks to “ an alliance between private financiers and 
religious scholars” (P 17). This “alliance between the rich and the wealthy and the Sharia 
scholars…served to depolitisize the Islamic movement and opened up new avenues of co-
operation between the government and (the) Islamic opposition” (P 17). The founder of 
the Islamic banking movement in Egypt Dr. Ahmed al Najjar was a German educationist 
and financial economist “at considerable distance from the Muslim Brotherhood” (P 19). 
The first Islamic bank of Egypt was known as the Nasser Social Bank. It was owned by 
the government and a major purpose of its establishment was to delegitimise the social 
efforts of the Ikhwan. Prince Muhammad  al Faisal played a pioneering role in the 
development of Islamic banks in the Gulf and North Africa. The Saudi sponsored 
international religious network recruited many Ulema to the Islamic banking movements, 
all of them dissidents of the Ikhwan (such as Yusuf al Qardavi, Abd as Sattar Abu 
Ghaddah, and Hussain Ahmed Hassan). A leading Deobandi critic of the 
Jama’at’i’Islami, Taqi Usmani was recruited some years later. 
 
According to Kahf “(t) his alliance between the Ulema and the Muslim 
bourgeoisie creates a new power structure” (P 25). The Ulema “created a buffer that can 
be used in support of the main shareholders and professional managers of Islamic banks 
who are usually drawn from commercial banks” (P 25). 
 
The Sharia scholars need the support of the banks and the government “for the 
rising Islamic movement sidelined most of them” (P25). There are innumerable material 
benefits the Ulema enjoy because of the support of the bankers. One only has to visit Dar 
ul Ulum Korangi to ascertain this. As Monzer Kahf notes.” The alliance gives the Ulema 
a new source of income that by far exceeds what they were used to earning. It gives them 
opening to a new life-style that includes air travel, some times in private jets and stay in 
five star hotel suits. In addition they are frequently commissioned to undertake paid 
research” (P 26). 
  
“Bestowing a new income and new associations it opens the Ulema and exposes them to 
experiences that were even hard to imagine in the past. The Ulema that in the 1950s, and 1960s had 
weather beaten dead skin hands, humble clothing, sitting in the cold teaching on the ground of mosques are 
now replaced with soft living Ulema who are used to luxurious garments, services of five star hotels and 
expensive restaurants, (this) has resulted in changes in (their) viewpoints”(P 27) 
 
Kahf further notes, “The bankers have always been very sensitive in selecting the 
type of Ulema who are acceptable to both the government and the general public. The 
Ulema allied with the Islamic movements are avoid(ed)” (P28) The Islamic banks seek to 
promote “reconciliatory reformers who abandoned the banner of Syed Qutb, “Take Islam 
all together or leave it” (P 28) 
 
The pro imperialist stance of the Islamic banks is emphasized by Ibrahim Warde 
(chp2). He notes that with the exception of the Sudan “Islamic finance (is) firmly 
embedded in the US centered political and economic order oriented towards preserving 
the status quo. In every new market they penetrate Islamic banks establish links with the 
local legal power structure and work within established oligopolies. (They) are keen on 
working with the major international financial institutions. The capitals of Islamic finance 
are London, Geneva and the Bahamas not Jeddah, Cairo or Karachi. (They) have a stake 
in the stability of international markets where they are heavily invested. They hold a large 
percentage of their deposits abroad. The large international banks were instruments in the 
very creation of the Islamic banks” (P41). In countries such as Bahrain, Qatar and 
Malaysia governments have used Islamic banks as a tool for policy liberalization and 
deregulation (P47). The Islamic finance movement has during the 1990s moved further 
and further away from traditional Islamic practices and in the name of urf and masliha 
sanctioned virtually all interest replicating contracts (P 47-49). As Warde stresses 
“Islamic bank(ing) has become more pragmatic and is increasingly converging with 
conventional banks” (P 49). It is laughable that much of the “ijtihad” justifying Islamic 
bank practices now takes place at the Harvard Islamic Finance Information Forum 
(HIFIP) 
 
For these reasons the Islamic banks were deeply shocked by the post 9/11 
suspicions against them voiced by America, Prince Muhammad al Faisal was the first and 
most vocal denouncer of the counter attack on America. He wrote “We all condemn in 
the strongest possible terms the terrorist September 11 attacks as a serious crime (Gulf 
News 12th September 2001). Saleh Kamal boss of Al Barakah was equally distressed. The 
West has recognized the geniusness of the Islamic finance movements’ commitment to 
American hegemony and no case brought against the Islamic banks in the wake of the 
September 11 counter attack has succeeded. 
 
The similarity between Islamic and mainstream banking practices is illustrated by 
Tarik Yusufi’s paper (Chap 3). The domination of murabiha in the Islamic banks’ 
financing packages shows that they are not an alternative but rather a compliment to the 
standard products of commercial banks Yusufi shows ( P 65-66) that murabaha contracts 
are “virtual replicas” of interest based debt contracts. He shows that the same systemic 
factors account for the dominance of interest replica and straightforward interest 
financing and that there is convergence between them. There is nothing peculiarly 
Islamic about Islamic finance or about the behavior of Islamic capitalists. Empirical 
studies have shown that the financial performance of Islamic banks has generally been 
inferior to conventional banks and Islamic banks have over the years became particularly 
dependent on state subsidies and a host of other forms of government support and 
patronage (chap 5). In chapter 6 Rodney Wilson documents the role Islamic mutual funds 
have played in accelerating capital flight from the Muslim world to the West. Far from 
contributing to national development Islamic banks and financial institutions are 
facilitating the rich and wealthy to transfer their funds to safe havens in Europe and 
America. Foreign direct investment from one Muslim country to another is miniscule in 
relative terms in Islamic mutual funds invest almost exclusively in America and Europe. 
As Wilson notes “Islamic capital flourish (es) in the liberalized environment of the West” 
( P 130). He sees contemporary Islamic capitalists as “cultural brokers acting as 
institutions facilitating the westernization of the Muslim countries Islamic funds and 
banks serve as conduits for money that was previously held outside the banking system 
and the Muslim world to be transferred to Western financial markets. Shariah advisors of 
Islamic banks are legitimating this transfer of funds. 
 
Wilson estimates that Gulf “filthy rich” nationals totaling about 200,000 held over 
$ 2 trillion in Europe and America in 2002 ( P135). The predominant proportion of this 
investment is in America 
 
The total number of Islamic funds had increased from 9 in 1993 to 105 in 2002. 
Most of these are owned and managed by American and European financial institutions, 
such as Pemal Asset Management, Keppel Insurance, Pictet, UBL, CITI, First Investment 
Company etc ( P 141). The four largest islamic funds management companies are from 
America, Britain, Germany and Switzerland. 
 
Rodney and Wilson conclude, “ (P) olitical Islam should not be conflated with 
Islam’s other economic and social dimensions. Even governments in the Muslim world 
that wage war against political Islam recognize the difference between Islam’s political 
and economic practitioners” (P 287). Islamic finance is an imperialist initiative and as 
Henry and Wilson note “ Islamic banks remain highly vulnerable to external forces 
emanating from New York and Washington DC. Political Islam in the modern world is 
suspended between radical and moderate poles and the emergence of a distinctly Islamic 
form of capitalism (an) alliance between the Ulema, bankers and entrepreneurs could tip 
the balance and effect a deep structural transformation in the Muslim world. United 
States policy makers might well ponder over the implications of Kahf’s arguments, 
instead of supporting a bunch of middle class NGOs they might assist Islamic institutions 
that promote the spirit of capitalism and free enterprise” (P 296-297) 
 
The natural affinity between the imperialists and the Islamic finance agenda is 
illustrated by the organic link between Islamic and mainstream financial institutions. 
Islamic banks can either be instruments for financial policy liberalization within the 
Muslim world or else a conduit for transferring money from Muslim countries to 
capitalist metropolises specially London, New York and Geneva. The Jordan case study 
(Chap 9) shows that Islamic banks make extensive use of trade financing and commodity 
speculation to transfer funds abroad. 
 
The Kuwait study shows that policy liberalization has contributed to a softening 
up of the Islamic movement through the work of Kuwait Finance House. This has not 
been the case however in Egypt (Chap 12) or in Turkey (chap 10) where there is 
widespread criticism of the Islamic banks by the Islamic parties and the Islamic banks are 
now seen to be the pawns of the secular governments Sadat’s and Mubarak’s attempt to 
transform the Ikhwan into an Islamic equivalent of the Christian Democratic Party has 
manifestly failed. 
 
Typically “Islamic banks offer cover to the governments for the further 
engagement with international financial institutions and the Washington consensus” (P 
261) As Samir Soliman observes “Islamic financial banners wave freely in the air 
unfolding a harmless variety of meanings” (P 264). This is especially true in the Gulf 
which is the only region in the world where Islamic banks have a significant share of 
bank deposits and which are for all intents and purposes American colonies. The Kuwait 
case study shows how Islamic banking is being used to tip the scales in favor of 
American reformers within the government. There is widespread recognition that “it is in 
the Western world’s interest to encourage the integra (tion) of Islamic financial 
instruments into international finance. Islamic capitalism is not a threat to Western 
capitalism. The IMF and the World Bank encouraged the establishment of the Islamic 
Financial Service Board that advises the central banks on the regulation of Islamic banks 
and facilitates standardization” (P 293). Integration between Islamic and western 
capitalism is being promoted by Islamic bonds “which have exactly the same features as 
their conventional equivalents and yield fixed rate of return comparable to market rates of 
interest” (P 294). Today Islamic capitalism  is being sponsored by “ a much better 
qualified and financially aware generation of  Sharia scholars in the Gulf approving 
radically innovative Islamic financial products” (P 295) 
 
This is a well-researched anthology written by insiders. It illustrates the 
imperialist sponsorship of the Islamic finance movement and the dangers it poses to the 
Islamic movements in the Muslim world. Separate chapters on Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are badly missed and one hopes that OUP will add 
these to a future edition of this book. 
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